Freedom and Responsibility

Among all that exists on earth, man alone can ask himself what he ought to do, weigh his choices, and decide. The animal follows its instinct, but man deliberates. This capacity to determine oneself, to choose among several paths, is what we call freedom. It is at the foundation of the whole moral life, for without it there would be neither merit nor fault, neither praise nor reproach. But freedom is often misunderstood: it is confused with the power to do anything at all, whereas it is something quite different. Reason, in examining what freedom truly is, discovers that it is ordered to the good, and that it is fulfilled in choosing it.

What freedom is

Freedom is first recognized by the experience each one has of it. Before a decision, I deliberate: I weigh the pros and cons, I consider several possibilities, then I decide. This moment when I say to myself “I could do this, or that, and it is up to me to decide” is the very experience of freedom. It supposes two faculties of the soul that work together: the intelligence, which presents to man what is good or bad, and the will, which chooses. The animal is moved by its instinct: it pursues what attracts it without being able to ask whether it ought to. Man, because he understands, can judge his own inclinations, resist them or follow them. This is why the free act is distinguished from the constrained act and the instinctive act. If I am pushed by force, my body moves but I have not acted; if I yield to a reflex without thinking, I have not truly chosen. The act is fully free when it proceeds from me, knowingly and by my own will. This mastery of self is the distinctive mark of man, and the foundation of his dignity: he is responsible for himself, able to govern his own conduct.

Freedom and responsibility

From freedom follows at once responsibility: to be responsible is to have to answer for one’s acts, to give account of them. And one answers only for what one has done freely. This is why no one reproaches the animal for following its hunger: it has not chosen. But the man who acts knowing what he does and willing it bears the responsibility of his act, good or bad. Praise and blame, merit and fault, the justice that rewards or punishes, all this supposes freedom. Without it, these notions collapse: one could not praise a man for a virtue he had not chosen, nor condemn him for an evil he could not have avoided.

But responsibility has degrees, for freedom itself can be hindered. Reason recognizes several things that diminish or remove the responsibility of an act. Ignorance first: the one who did not know, and could not know, what he was doing is not fully guilty. Constraint next: what is wrenched from me by force or by grave fear is not fully my act. Passion finally: a violent emotion, an anger, a fear, can carry man away and obscure his judgment, reducing his mastery accordingly. To judge a human act therefore requires weighing how much real knowledge and will there was. The more man knew and willed, the more he is responsible; the less he knew or could, the less he is. Responsibility is thus measured by the freedom that was really at stake.

Does freedom really exist?

Some deny that man is free. Everything, they say, is determined in advance: our choices would be only the product of causes that escape us, heredity, upbringing, the brain, circumstances. What we believe to be a free choice would be only an illusion, the feeling of a freedom that does not exist. This position is called determinism. Reason can answer it. First, to deny freedom amounts to contradicting oneself: the one who asks me to believe it supposes that I can weigh his arguments and change my mind, hence that I am free to judge. A being entirely determined would not reason, it would undergo its ideas without being able to judge them. Next, the inward experience of deliberation is too constant and too strong to be only a mirage: we know, at the moment of choosing, that the decision depends on us, and we know it better than any theory that denies it. Finally, the whole of human life, law, morality, education, the promise, remorse, rests on the conviction that man is responsible. It is true that many things weigh on our choices and incline them; human freedom is not absolute, it is exercised under conditions, with limits. But to weigh is not to constrain: a strong inclination still leaves room for choice, and it is precisely the property of man to be able, to a certain extent, to determine himself despite his inclinations.

True freedom: the choice of the good

There remains the most important question, and the most misunderstood. Many think that freedom consists in being able to do anything at all, and that it would be all the greater the less any rule limits it. This is an error that reason can correct. Freedom is made for the good. It is the power to choose, but this power is ordered to an end, which is to choose what is truly good for man. To be able to choose evil is therefore not the perfection of freedom, but its weakness. Just as an intelligence that errs uses its power less well than an intelligence that attains the true, a will that chooses evil is a freedom that fails itself, that misses what it is made for.

Experience confirms it: evil, far from setting free, enslaves. The one who gives himself to an evil passion becomes little by little its slave; the liar is the prisoner of his lies, the man dominated by a vice loses the mastery of himself he thought to enlarge. The more one chooses evil, the less one is able to choose otherwise: freedom shrinks as it is abused. Conversely, the man who chooses the good makes himself more and more master of himself, more able to love, to give, to stand firm. It is in this that true freedom grows. Christ said it with force: “Whoever gives himself to sin is a slave of sin.” John 8:34. Sin presents itself as a liberation and proves to be a servitude. And true freedom, the one that makes man fully master of himself and able to do good, is a fruit that Christ comes to give: “If then the Son sets you free, you will be truly free.” John 8:36. Thus reason and faith meet: to be free is not to do what one wants, it is to become able to will and to do the good. Freedom is fully itself only when turned toward that for which it is made.